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Comment on “Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences”: 
Balancing on a Budget Line†
By Thomas Epper and Helga Fehr-Duda *
In a recent experimental study of intertemporal risky decision 
making, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) find that subjects exhibit a 
preference for intertemporal diversification, which is inconsistent 
with discounted expected utility theory. It was claimed that their 
results are also at odds with models involving probability weight-
ing, such as rank-dependent utility and cumulative prospect theory. 
Here we demonstrate, however, that rank-dependent probability 
weighting explains intertemporal diversification if decision makers 
care about portfolio risk. Moreover, we provide a unified account of 
all of Andreoni and Sprenger’s key findings. (JEL C91, D81, D91)
In a recent paper, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)—henceforth, AS—investigate 
decision making when both risk and delay are present. Their experiment is based 
on the convex time budget (CTB) method by which subjects choose a portfolio of 
potentially risky payments at two different future dates. This feature generates a 
richer environment than conventional choices between smaller sooner and larger 
later payments as it enables subjects to diversify their earnings across time. In their 
study, AS focus on the common-ratio property of discounted expected utility. For 
example, if a sooner payment will materialize 100 percent of the time and a later 
payment 80 percent of the time, then scaling down the probabilities to 50 percent 
and 40 percent, respectively, should not affect individuals’ intertemporal alloca-
tions. AS find that subjects exhibit common-ratio violations1 in their intertemporal 
allocations, consistent with the large body of evidence on atemporal risky decisions 
(Allais 1953; Conlisk 1989; Starmer 2000; Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012). However, 
they also detect a pattern of behavior that, prima vista, seems to be at odds with 
models involving probability weighting, such as rank-dependent utility (RDU) 
(Quiggin 1982) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
When all payments are risky, their experimental design produces states of nature in 
which only one of the  payments arrives. Faced with this possibility, many subjects 
1 When, as in this example, one of the choice pairs features a certainty, the term “certainty effect” is typically 
used for common-ratio violations.
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exhibit a preference for  intertemporal diversification: they shy away from extreme 
allocations because they might end up with no payment at all and, therefore, prefer 
a more evenly balanced portfolio than in the case when all payments are guaranteed.
This evidence of intertemporal diversification triggered successive experimental 
work by Cheung (2015) and Miao and Zhong (2015) who examine the robustness 
of the AS findings. The upshot of these investigations is that, by and large, subjects’ 
behavior depends significantly on whether diversification opportunities are present 
or not.
In this paper we demonstrate that probability weighting in rank-dependent mod-
els is able to explain subjects’ preference for intertemporal diversification as well 
as their proneness to intertemporal common-ratio violations and, therefore, all the 
major AS findings. The method by which decision makers evaluate future prospects 
is key for our results. In our analysis, they care about the risk of their entire portfo-
lios, consisting of two potential payments at different future dates, and not about the 
isolated risks of the individual payments.2 Consequently, as a representative RDU 
decision maker evaluates a payment occurring in conjunction with another payment 
more favorably than the same payment occurring in isolation, i.e., when the other 
payment fails to materialize, she prefers a more evenly balanced portfolio. For such 
a decision maker it would be irrational to choose extreme allocations because she 
would forgo the utility gains from diversification. If there are no opportunities to 
diversify, however, risk does not affect her intertemporal allocations. Our analysis 
shows that rank-dependent models perform well not only in their original domain of 
atemporal decisions but also in intertemporal settings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly review the 
specifics of the CTB design. In Section II, we show that rank-dependent models are 
able to accommodate all the characteristic pattern in the AS data. We conclude with 
a brief discussion in Section  III where we argue that rank-dependent models are 
superior to other approaches suggested in the literature. Additional materials cover-
ing these alternatives are presented in the online Appendix.
I. The Convex Time Budget Experiment
In the AS experiment, subjects are endowed with 100 tokens that can be allocated 
in any integer combination (n, 100 − n) to a sooner payment at time t and a later 
payment at t + k.3 Tokens allocated to the later payment are exchanged for cash at a 
constant rate4  a t+k , whereas tokens allocated to the sooner payment are exchanged at 
a rate  a t that varies with an interest rate r such that  a t = ( a t+k )/(1 + r). In accordance 
with AS, we will henceforth label experimental earnings “consumption.” Allocating 
n tokens to the sooner payment yields a, potentially risky, consumption stream 
( c t ,  c t+k ) = (n a t ,(100 − n) a t+k ). Hence, on a given budget line (1 + r) c t +  c t+k 
= 100 a t+k holds. Since  a t+k is constant throughout the experiment, changes in the 
budget constraint are governed by the interest rate r, which takes on values from 
2 In online Appendix A1 we investigate two alternative evaluation methods, the separable and the recursive meth-
ods. Neither one of them provides a coherent explanation for all the patterns in the AS data.
3 Sooner payments are always made in t = 7 days after the experiment. There are two different time delays 
k ∈ {28, 56} days. For the purpose of this paper, changes in k are of no concern.
4 In the experiment  a t+k =  USD 0.2.
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0 percent up to 2,116.6 percent per annum. Additionally, AS assume that subjects 
discount the future at a constant rate, which implies an exponentially declining dis-
count function δ(t).5
Furthermore, all the uncertainty concerning sooner and later payments is resolved 
simultaneously at the end of the experimental session, i.e., subjects know by then 
which consumption stream will materialize. Finally, and most importantly, sooner 
and later payments arrive independently with probabilities  p 1 and  p 2 , respectively. As 
mentioned in the introduction, decision makers care about portfolio risk and, there-
fore, about the joint distribution of the random variables  ˜  ct and  ˜  ct+k . Consequently, 
the independent arrival of the payments generates four distinct states of nature: 
either both payments arrive, only the sooner payment arrives, only the later payment 
arrives, or no payment at all arrives. These four states of nature define the prospect 
over the possible consumptions streams,
P(  p 1 ,  p 2 )
 =  ( ( c t ,  c t+k ),  p 1  p 2 ;( c t , 0),  p 1 (1 −  p 2 );(0,  c t+k ),(1 −  p 1 ) p 2 ;(0, 0),(1 −  p 1 )(1 −  p 2 ) ) .
In line with the previous literature (e.g., Loewenstein and Prelec 1992), we repre-
sent preferences over consumption streams by an additive and separable functional, 
such that the discounted utility of ( ˜  ct ,  ˜  ct+k ) equals v( ˜  ct )δ(t) + v( ˜  ct+k )δ(t + k), where 
the random variable  ˜  ct (  ˜  ct+k ) takes on the values 0 or  c t ( 0 or  c t+k ), and v satisfies 
v(0) = 0,  v′ > 0 and  v″ < 0.
Under discounted expected utility the prospect P( p 1 ,  p 2 ) is evaluated as
(1)  V DEU  ( P(  p 1 ,  p 2 ) ) =  p 1  p 2 ( v( c t )δ(t) + v( c t+k )δ(t + k) ) 
  +  p 1 (1 −  p 2 )v( c t )δ(t) + (1 −  p 1 ) p 2 v( c t+k )δ(t + k)
  =  p 1 v( c t )δ(t) +  p 2 v( c t+k )δ(t + k),
leading to the first-order condition (FOC)
(2)  FO C DEU ( P(  p 1 ,  p 2 ) ) :   v
′ ( c t ) _ v′ ( c t+k )
 = (1 + r)  δ(t + k) _δ(t)  
 p 2  _ p 1 .
Recall that subjects’ decision variable is the number of tokens n allocated to the 
sooner payment. Because ( c t ,  c t+k ) = (n a t ,(100 − n) a t+k ), equation (2) determines 
the optimal level of n,  n ∗ (r), which in turn determines the optimal consumption 
5 Our analysis does not depend on the assumption of constant discounting.
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levels  c t ∗ (r) and  c t+k ∗ (r). In equilibrium, any increase in the value of the right-hand 
side of equation (2) has to be balanced by a commensurate increase in the ratio of 
the marginal utilities on the left-hand side in order to maintain optimality. Under 
strictly concave utility, i.e., decreasing marginal utility, rebalancing  c t ∗ and  c t+k ∗ on 
the  budget line entails decreasing  c t ∗ and thereby automatically increasing  c t+k ∗ . 
Therefore,  c t ∗ decreases in r and  p 2 / p 1 and any other factor that might appear on the 
right-hand side of equation (2).
The AS experiment involves three different common-ratio situations with vary-
ing manifestations of certainty: a baseline pair where P(1, 1) is combined with its 
scaled-down counterpart P(λ, λ), 0 < λ < 1, and two differential risk conditions 
where P(1, q) and P(q, 1) are paired with P(λ, λq) and P(λq, λ), respectively. In 
the experiment, the scaling factor λ amounts to 0.5 and the probability q is fixed at 
0.8. Discounted expected utility theory makes clear predictions for all three pairs of 
prospects: allocations should not change whenever  p 1 and  p 2 are scaled down by a 
common factor. However, AS find that scaling down the probabilities by λ = 0.5 
always results in significant shifts in budget shares. Moreover, subjects’ behavior 
differs distinctly between baseline and differentialrisk conditions.
Concerning the baseline pair, average sooner consumption levels in the certain 
(1, 1)-condition are initially greater than in the risky (0.5, 0.5)-condition and drop 
more steeply with increasing interest rates r, as depicted in the left panel of Figure 1: 
AS’s original graph shows a crossover of the (1, 1)-curve and the (0.5.0.5)-curve, a 
result that was recently replicated by Cheung (2015) and Miao and Zhong (2015). 
When both payments are guaranteed and the interest rate is zero, subjects allocate 
the greatest part of their budget to the sooner payment. Since interest rates rise 
substantially,6 allocations to the sooner payment become increasingly expensive 
and, hence, drop steeply. In contrast, when there is the possibility that only one of 
the payments will arrive, subjects choose a more evenly balanced portfolio of sooner 
and later payments than in the certain case, which is consistent with a diversification 
motive. In fact, AS report that in the (1, 1)-condition, 80.7 percent of allocations are 
at one or the other budget corners while only 26.1 percent are corner solutions in the 
(0.5, 0.5)-condition.
Contrary to the baseline crossover result, scaling down the probabilities in the dif-
ferential risk conditions results in consistently smaller or larger allocations, evident 
in the right panel of Figure 1. Clearly, both patterns of behavior are incompatible 
with the additively separable discounted-expected-utility model. But how can these 
findings be reconciled with probability weighting in rank-dependent models, such 
as RDU or cumulative prospect theory?
II. Rank-Dependent Prospect Valuation
Rank-dependent models depart from expected utility theory in that consequences 
are ordered by magnitude and their utilities are weighted by decision weights 
(Quiggin 1982; Wakker 1994). They feature a potentially nonlinear probability 
weighting function g(p) obeying  g′ > 0, g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1, which provides the 
6 Annual interest rates underlying the data in Figure 1 amount to 0, 85.7, 226.3, 449.7, 796.0, 1,323.4, and 
2116.6 percent.
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basis for calculating the decision weights. Decision weights involve cumulative 
probabilities, i.e., probabilities for receiving a particular outcome or anything bet-
ter. Therefore, only the decision weight of the best outcome is equal to its simple 
probability weight. In the following, we assume that decision makers’ preferences 
conform to RDU.7 Details on the special case of Halevy’s (2008) model of time-
dependent probability weighting are delegated to online Appendix A2 (see also 
Epper and Fehr-Duda 2012).
As P(  p 1 ,  p 2 ) is a prospect over four potential consumption streams, these have 
to be rank-ordered according to the principles of RDU. Clearly, the materialization 
of both payments ( c t ,  c t+k ) yields the highest utility, and no payment the lowest. 
But which consumption stream is ranked second and third depends on whether the 
discounted utility of sooner consumption is greater than the discounted utility of 
later consumption or vice versa. For brevity, we introduce the following  notation: 
c t ≻ (≺ )  c t+k ⇔ v( c t )δ(t) > (< ) v( c t+k )δ(t + k). Decision weights for P( p 1 ,  p 2 ) 
are summarized in Table 1.8
7 Cumulative prospect theory coincides with RDU when only gains are involved.
8 In the case of indifference, the prospect involves only three outcomes with the intermediate decision weight 
amounting to g(  p 1 +  p 2 −  p 1  p 2 ) − g(  p 1  p 2 ).
Figure 1. Average Consumption Curves   
_ c t (  p 1 ,  p 2 )
Notes: Left panel (baseline conditions): The figure presents the observed mean sooner con-
sumption levels,  
_ ct (1, 1) and  _ ct (0.5, 0.5), as functions of (1 + r) p 2 / p 1 = 1 + r for the cer-
tain (diamonds) and the risky (squares) conditions when later consumption is delayed by 
another 28 days. Right panel (differential risk conditions): The graphs correspond to observed 
mean sooner consumption levels  
_ c t (1, 0.8) (diamonds) and  _ c t (0.5, 0.4) (triangles) as well 
as  
_ c t (0.8, 1) (squares) and  _ c t (0.4, 0.5) (crosses) as functions of (1 + r) p 2 / p 1 when later con-
sumption is delayed by another 28 days.
Source: Left panel: Andreoni and Sprenger (2012, p. 3,367, Figure 2). Right panel: Andreoni 
and Sprenger (2012, p. 3,370, Figure 4).
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The respective first-order conditions are given by
(3) FO C RDU ( P(  p 1 ,  p 2 ) ) :   v′ ( c t ) _  v′ ( c t+k ) 
  = 
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
(1 + r)  δ(t + k) _δ(t)   
g(  p 1  p 2 ) + g(  p 1 +  p 2 −  p 1  p 2 ) − g(  p 1 )___
g(  p 1 )  if  c t ≻  c t+k 
(1 + r)  δ(t + k) _δ(t)   
g(  p 2 ) ___  
g(  p 1  p 2 ) + g(  p 1 +  p 2 −  p 1  p 2 ) − g(  p 2 ) if  c t ≺  c t+k .
The effects of a change in ranks of  c t and  c t+k on the allocation decision depend on 
the characteristics of the probability weighting function g. There is a large body of 
evidence that the representative probability weighting function is inverse S-shaped,9 
characterized by a concave segment over small probabilities, such that the function 
intersects the diagonal from above at some probability smaller than 0.5, and by a 
convex segment over medium and large probabilities (see Gonzalez and Wu 1999 
and Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper 2010 among others). The latter region is char-
acterized by Jensen’s inequality g(μ p 1 + (1 − μ) p 2 ) < μg( p 1 ) + (1 − μ)g(  p 2 ) 
for all 0 < μ < 1.10 The typical function increases steeply in the vicinities of zero 
and one, but is relatively flat otherwise. Therefore, it is almost linear over a con-
siderable range of probabilities and can be approximated by   g(p) = d + sp with 
0 < d, s < 1 (Tversky and Fox 1995; Tversky and Wakker 1995). Over that range, 
probability weights grow subproportionally in p, i.e,   g( p 1 )/  g( p 2 ) <   g(λ p 1 )/  g(λ p 2 ) 
for  p 1 <  p 2 and 0 < λ < 1. Subproportionality, at least over some range of prob-
abilities, is a general feature of probability weighting functions that maps the cer-
tainty effect and general common-ratio violations (Prelec 1998).
In the following, we examine the implications of a representative probability 
weighting function for the three prototypical common-ratio pairs of prospects P(1, 1) 
9 This observation applies both to the majority of individuals and to aggregate behavior (Fehr-Duda and Epper 
2012).
10 Note that in conjunction with a concave utility function v convexity of g implies risk aversion.
Table 1—RDU Decision Weights
Consumption
stream Probability
Decision weight
 c t ≻  c t+k  c t ≺  c t+k 
( c t ,  c t+k )  p 1  p 2 g(  p 1  p 2 )
( c t , 0)  p 1 (1 −  p 2 ) g(  p 1 ) − g(  p 1  p 2 ) g(  p 1 +  p 2 −  p 1  p 2 ) − g(  p 2 )
(0,  c t+k ) (1 −  p 1 ) p 2 g(  p 1 +  p 2 −  p 1  p 2 ) − g(  p 1 ) g(  p 2 ) − g(  p 1  p 2 )
(0, 0) (1 −  p 1 )(1 −  p 2 ) 1 − g(  p 1 +  p 2 −  p 1  p 2 )
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versus P(λ, λ), P(1, q) versus P(λ, λq), and P(q, 1) versus P(λq, λ). The ratios of 
decision weights in the first-order conditions for λ = 0.5 and q = 0.8 are displayed 
in Table 2. For illustrative purposes, the right-most column of Table 2 presents a 
numerical example of representative decision weight ratios based on Prelec’s (1998) 
probability weighting function.
The baseline conditions: P(1, 1) versus P(λ, λ). Clearly, the ratio of decision 
weights in the first-order condition, equation (3), equals 1 in the certain case. 
Prospect valuation in the scaled-down condition yields
(4)  V RDU ( P(λ, λ) ) 
  = 
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
g(λ)v( c t )δ(t) +  ( g( λ 2 ) + g(2λ −  λ 2 ) − g(λ) ) v( c t+k )δ(t + k) if  c t ≻  c t+k 
 ( g( λ 2 ) + g(2λ −  λ 2 ) − g(λ) ) v( c t )δ(t) + g(λ)v( c t+k )δ(t + k) if  c t ≺  c t+k .
If strict convexity holds for the range of probabilities under consideration, the fol-
lowing inequality is satisfied:
(5)  g(λ) − g( λ 2 ) < g(2λ −  λ 2 ) − g(λ),
Table 2—Decision Weight Ratios
Condition Ratio Value
(1, 1)  g(1) _
g(1)  1
(0.5, 0.5),  c t ≻  c t+k  g(0.25) + g(0.75) − g(0.5)  __ g(0.5)  1.053
(0.5, 0.5),  c t ≺  c t+k  g(0.5)  __  g(0.25) + g(0.75) − g(0.5) 0.950
(1, 0.8)  g(0.8) _
g(1)  0.624
(0.5, 0.4),  c t ≻  c t+k  g(0.2) + g(0.7) − g(0.5)  __ g(0.5)  0.912
(0.5, 0.4),  c t ≺  c t+k  g(0.4)  __  g(0.2) + g(0.7) − g(0.4) 0.858
(0.8, 1)  g(1) _ 
g(0.8) 1.604
(0.4, 0.5),  c t ≻  c t+k  g(0.2) + g(0.7) − g(0.4)  __ g(0.4)  1.166
(0.4, 0.5),  c t ≺  c t+k  g(0.5)  __  g(0.2) + g(0.7) − g(0.5) 1.097
Note: Values derived from Prelec’s (1998) probability weighting function g( p) 
= exp(−β(−ln p)α), with α = 0.5 and β = 1.
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entailing for the ratios of decision weights in the first-order condition pertaining to 
c t ≻  c t+k and  c t ≺  c t+k 
(6)   g( λ 
2 ) + g(2λ −  λ 2 ) − g(λ)   ___ 
g(λ) > 1 >  
g(λ)  ___  
g( λ 2 ) + g(2λ −  λ 2 ) − g(λ)  .
Recall that the optimum level of sooner consumption decreases with the magnitude 
of the ratio of decision weights. Therefore, sooner consumption is lower in the risky 
situation than in the certain one when  c t ≻  c t+k , and higher when  c t ≺  c t+k . Hence, 
RDU generally predicts a crossover of the (1, 1)–and the (λ, λ) -consumption curves 
if probability weights are convex, which is usually the case over the range of prob-
abilities under consideration here, i.e., [0.25, 1], resulting from  p 1 =  p 2 = 0.5.11 In 
that situation, all the possible consumption streams are equally likely and, therefore, 
discounted expected utility assigns the same weight to  c t and  c t+k irrespective of 
their materializing in conjunction or in isolation.12 RDU with an inverse S-shaped 
probability weighting function, however, entails a pronounced overweighting of 
the extreme consumption streams ( c t ,  c t+k ) and (0, 0) while the intermediate ones 
( c t , 0) and (0,  c t+k ) are underweighted relative to their objective probabilities 
(Wakker 2010; Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012). This characteristic of decision weights 
maps people’s dislike of the situation when only one of the payments arrives and 
represents their preference for intertemporal diversification.
Our approach captures the specific characteristics of the decision situation in the 
CTB task: subjects choose a portfolio of future payments, the arrival of which is 
determined independently by two random draws. Since subjects can choose any con-
vex combination of sooner and later payments, this decision environment produces 
opportunities for portfolio diversification. Now suppose that a single draw controls 
both payments, generating the prospect  P SINGLE (λ) = (( c t ,  c t+k ), λ;(0, 0), 1 − λ). 
Clearly, in that case, diversification is not possible, and the same decision weight, 
g(λ), is assigned to both  c t and  c t+k . A comparison of the respective decision weights 
shows that, in total, positive consumption utilities carry a larger weight in the inde-
pendent-draw situation than in the single-draw one. In the independent case, decision 
weights assigned to  c t and  c t+k amount to g(λ) or g( λ 2 ) + g(2λ −  λ 2 ) − g(λ). As 
g(λ) < g( λ 2 ) + g(2λ −  λ 2 ) − g(λ) holds over the convex region of g (see equa-
tion (5)), a risk averse RDU maximizer always prefers two independent draws to a 
single draw determining both payments, i.e., she prefers a situation with diversifica-
tion opportunities to a situation with a lack thereof. Consequently, we predict behavior 
to differ systematically between these types of situations, which was recently corrobo-
rated by the experimental study of Miao and Zhong (2015).13
11 Compare, for example, with Figure 1 in Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012, p. C-1), which shows parametric as well 
as nonparametric estimates of probability weights for a student and a broad population sample.
12 In this context, discounted expected utility theory’s failure of accommodating intertemporal diversification has 
long been identified as one of its main weaknesses (Richard 1975; Kihlstrom and Mirman 1974; Epstein and Tanny 
1980). To remedy this problem, some authors proposed an intertemporal utility function on top of instantaneous 
(atemporal) utility, see online Appendix A4 for details.
13 Cheung (2015) also studied behavior in CTBs under positively correlated payments. Contrary to Miao and 
Zhong (2015), where the average token allocation in the certain condition practically coincides with the allocation 
in the correlated condition, Cheung (2015) finds a crossover of the curves for the certain and the correlated-risk 
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The differential risk conditions: P(1, q) versus P(λ, λq) and P(q, 1) versus 
P(λ q, λ). 
The prospects involving one certain payment constitute binary prospects and, 
therefore, contrary to the scaled-down cases there is no problem with changing 
ranks. As noted above, the representative probability weighting function is near 
linear away from the boundaries. Using the linear approximation   g( p) = d + sp, 
introduced above, yields the following relationships for the first pair:
(7)  g( λ 
2 q) + g(λ + λq −  λ 2 q) − g(λ)  ___ 
g(λ) ≈  
  g(λq) _  g(λ)  ≈  
g(λq)  ___  
g( λ 2 q) + g(λ + λq −  λ 2 q) − g(λq)  .
Therefore, the ratios of decision weights are quite similar even though the rank order 
of  c t and  c t+k changes. Moreover, since   g is subproportional,
(8)   g(λq) _
g(λ) ≈  
  g(λq) _  g(λ) >   g(q) ≈ g(q)
holds.14 This result is an immediate consequence of the certainty effect captured by 
subproportional probability weights: reducing a certainty to a probability of q < 1 
has a much greater impact on behavior than reducing λ to λq has. Hence, for suit-
able values of λ and q, the sooner-consumption curve for P(λ, λq) does not cross 
the respective curve for P(1, q) and always lies below it. This is exactly the pattern 
found by AS, depicted in Figure 1. Given the typical shape of probability weights, 
a linear approximation works well over the range under consideration here, i.e., 
[0.2, 0.8], which is clearly bounded away from zero and one.15 It is straightforward 
to show that, when the probabilities are flipped to produce the reverse pair of pros-
pects, P(q, 1) and P(λq, λ), the opposite result holds. Therefore, probability weight-
ing predicts behavior in the differential risk conditions as found by AS.
III. Discussion
We have demonstrated that rank-dependent probability weighting correctly pre-
dicts behavior in the baseline as well as the differential risk conditions, accounting 
for both the intertemporal certainty effect and the preference for diversification evi-
dent in subjects’ behavior. Hence, the family of rank-dependent models provides a 
unified explanation for all of the key AS findings. However, rank-dependent models 
are not the only approaches that can accommodate the evidence of the CTB experi-
ment. AS mention the so-called u − v model as another promising candidate.16 The 
conditions, albeit less strongly pronounced than in the independent-risk case. We surmise that subjects may have 
tried hedging across conditions, possibly because of difficulties of understanding the experimental instructions. See 
Cheung (2015), footnote 21 and his Appendix D.
14 See also the numerical calibrations in Table 2.
15 Refer, for example, to Figure 1 in Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012, p. C-1). Under conventional parametric speci-
fications of g( p) and representative parameter values, a crossover is predicted only for q very close to one or λ very 
close to zero.
16 See also their discussion in Andreoni and Sprenger (2010).
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u − v model adheres to expected utility but assumes that the utility of uncertain 
outcomes u is distinct from the utility of certain outcomes v, with u being more 
concave than v. While u − v preferences can, in principle, account for the CTB 
findings when sooner and later payments arrive independently of each other, the 
model has a number of unattractive features. First, it generates a discontinuity and 
a violation of first-order stochastic dominance at certainty (Schmidt 1998). Second, 
the u − v model can only handle the certainty effect but not more general boundary 
effects which have been shown to emerge when there are more than two prospec-
tive outcomes (Camerer 1992; Harless and Camerer 1994). Furthermore, it predicts 
identical behavior in situations where the arrival of the payments is determined by 
two independent draws or by a single one.
Several other models, such as Kihlstrom and Mirman’s (1974) model of inter-
temporal risk aversion, can accommodate a preference for intertemporal diversifi-
cation as well. In online Appendix A3 we take up the Kihlstrom-Mirman approach 
and show that it predicts the AS baseline findings when assuming expected utility 
and positing a concave intertemporal transformation of the instantaneous utilities of 
consumption. However, this model is incapable of mapping intertemporal common-
ratio violations. The greatest weakness of such an approach, however, is its reliance 
on expected utility for atemporal decisions.
Overall, RDU can explain all of the major findings in CTB experiments and 
provides the most convincing explanation of the evidence. The model respects 
 first-order stochastic dominance, it can handle general boundary effects aside from 
the certainty effect, and correctly predicts behavior under different correlation struc-
tures. Thus, RDU and its cousins are an attractive modeling choice not only in atem-
poral, but also in intertemporal situations.
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